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Online content is increasingly enforced by private parties based on private 
regulation. One recent trend in the takedown of unlawful online content is 
the emergence of models, where trusted third parties –private or public– 
are given privileged notification channels for flagging infringing content.  
Despite increasing practical importance, these arrangements have received 
little scholarly attention. This article explores the functioning of trusted 
notifier-models and how they are addressed by the European lawmaker in 
the context of two intermediaries, online platforms and domain name 
registries. Depending on intermediary, trusted notifier-models can both be 
seen as extension of the existing notice-and-takedown regimes and an 
additional voluntary expedited-enforcement layer. The author argues that 
these trusted notifier-models are problematic given the broad room of 
autonomy that the legislator is leaving to private parties. Whereas models 
involving public authorities are subject to general administrative law 
principles as well as constitutional and human rights safeguards, the 
framework for private regulation (i.e. without intervention of public actors) 
is less clear. In the field of domain names, these legitimacy issues give raise 
to special concern given the detached relation between domain names and 
website content. The paper criticizes the lack of insights into existing 
arrangements and calls for increased transparency. The author concludes 
that a legislative minimum framework is desirable. 
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1. Introduction 
Eighteen years ago, the European legislator stated that “[i]n many cases (…) intermediaries are 
best placed to bring (…) infringing activities to an end.”1 This premise has kept its validity 
throughout the years but the answer to the question what this observation means for the role 
of intermediaries has changed. For almost twenty years, the liability exemption regime of the 
E-Commerce Directive has led to a more or less well-functioning2 notice-and-takedown regime 
in the European landscape, which has been refined and adapted by the courts3 and, over time, 
attracted significant legal scholarship. Given the substantial development of the Internet since 
the adoption of this framework and the large amounts of content being made available today, 
intermediaries’ role is constantly revisited. Currently, notably in connection to hosting 
providers or online platforms as gatekeepers, the European framework for intermediaries and 
unlawful content is undergoing substantial changes: on the one hand, the European legislator, 
in certain areas, proposes moving from the traditional notice-and-takedown towards a proactive 
regime, where unlawful content is automatically identified and blocked before being available 
on online platforms.4 On the other hand, the legislator works towards increasing the efficiency 
of the current regime. The focus of this article is on the latter.  
In both trajectories, the cat-and-mouse game of enforcing content is increasingly moving 
from the parliamentary and judiciary arena to the negotiation table of private actors.5 This 
development towards non-law-based measures6 is encouraged by the European lawmaker. The 
emergence of more or less voluntary arrangements, e.g. in forms of memoranda of 
understanding or codes of practices, has also been endorsed by others: in 2011, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noted in its Recommendation on 
Principles for Internet Policymaking that these “should encourage and facilitate voluntary 
cooperative efforts by the private sector to (…) address illegal activity (…) taking place over 
the Internet.”7 Frosio (2017) aptly describes these policy tendencies as a shift from 
“intermediary liability to intermediary responsibility”.8 
 
1 Recital 59 InfoSoc Directive. See also Jonathan Zittrain, ‘A History of Online Gatekeeping’ (2006) Harvard Journal 
of Law and Technology 254. 
2 In 2016, the European Commission deemed it generally fit for purpose, whereas the European Parliament in 2017 
called for clarifying action. 
3 Such as the Court of Justice’s case law and national courts, e.g. in Germany in the context of notice-and-staydown. 
4 E.g. in relation to copyright content with Article 17 of Directive (EU) 2019/790 on copyright and related rights 
in the Digital Single Market and in relation to terrorist content with Article 6 of the proposed Regulation on terrorist 
content. See Thomas Riis and Sebastian F Schwemer, ‘Leaving the European Safe Harbor, Sailing Towards 
Algorithmic Content Regulation’ (2019) 22 Journal of Internet Law 1–21. 
5 Already the E-Commerce Directive relied on codes of conduct for its implementation, see Art. 16 and recital 49 
Directive 2000/31/EC on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market [2000] OJ L 178/1 (E-Commerce Directive).  
6 See the differentiation between law-based and non-law-based blocking of content by the Council of Europe (CoE), 
see Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The rule of law on the Internet and in the wider digital 
world’ (Issue paper, December 2014) 13. 
7 Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OECD), ‘OECD Council Recommendation on Principles For 
Internet Policymaking’ (2011) 7. 
8 Giancarlo Frosio, ‘Why keep a dog and bark yourself? From Intermediary Liability to Responsibility’ (2017) 
Centre for International Intellectual Property Studies Research Paper No. 2017-11, 4 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2976023> 
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In the field of online content platforms, the European Commission recently endorsed 
the establishment of non-judicial takedown mechanisms, which rely on self-regulation.9 One 
proposed solution concerns privileged channels for takedown notices by so-called “trusted 
flaggers” or “trusted notifiers”, i.e. private or public entities with specific expertise in identifying 
illegal content. Such arrangements are or have been operational at different intermediary-levels; 
for example, for the content-related takedown of generic top-level (gTLD) domain names, the 
DNS-blocking of websites containing child sexual abuse material, or the takedown of terrorist 
propaganda on Youtube.  
Whereas many questions related to the liability exemption and accountability 
framework are well-studied10, trusted notifier arrangements have up until now –despite 
increasing practical importance– received little scholarly attention. The goal of this article is 
to fill this gap and to shed light on the workings and governance of trusted notifier-models put 
in place by two different kinds of intermediaries, firstly online platforms (hosting services) 
relating to the application layer of the Internet and secondly domain registries relating to the 
infrastructure layer.11 
This article is structured in the following way: first, it explores the general 
characteristics of trusted notifier-models. Then, it turns towards the recent regulatory 
intervention regarding online platforms and how underlying legitimacy concerns are suggested 
to be addressed in the absence of specific secondary legislation. Following these insights, it 
looks into the content-related takedown of domain names, where trusted notifier-models are 
relevant but have remained off lawmakers’ radar for now.12 By looking at this phenomenon in 
a horizontal fashion for different intermediaries, it finally provides a critical discussion and 
suggestions for improving the regulatory landscape. 
 
2. Characteristics of the trusted notifier-model 
When we look at the role of intermediaries in the takedown of unlawful content, there are 
roughly three scenarios that can be differentiated: firstly, an intermediary could take down 
content on its own independent initiative. Secondly, an intermediary could be obliged by a 
court order to take down content. Thirdly, an intermediary could be obliged to take down 
 
9 One conceptual definition understands regulation “as the means by which the state ‘seeks to encourage direct 
behaviour which it is assumed would not occur without such intervention’ and as such should be seen as distinct 
from the operation of the markets, even though the latter is underpinned by legal rules” see Julia Black, ‘Critical 
reflections on regulation’ (2002) Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 11 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/35985> accessed 13 December 2018. See Commission 
Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content online [2018] OJ 
L 63/50. 
10 See e.g. Christina Angelopoulos et al., Study of fundamental rights limitations for online enforcement through 
self- regulation, Institute for Information Law (IViR), 2016 <https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/1796>; 
Jaani Riordan, The Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Oxford University Press, 2016); Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou, 
‘Intermediaries’ liability for online copyright infringement in the EU: Evolutions and confusions’ (2015) Computer 
Law & Security Review 57; and in the context of injunctions against intermediaries Martin Husovec, ‘Accountable, 
Not Liable: Injunctions Against Intermediaries’ (2016) TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2016-012, 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract_id=2773768> 
11 Husovec, above n 10, 24 and 66, in a similar distinction calls them “proximate services” and “remote services”. 
12 This article focusses on domain name takedowns in relation to content hosted under the website accessible via 
the domain name, not in relation to the domain name itself. In other words, this article does not look at situations 
where the domain name as such infringes rights and leads to a takedown. On the notion ‘takedown’, see Sebastian 
F Schwemer, ‘On domain registries and unlawful content’ (2018) 26 International Journal of Law and Information 
Technology 273, 277. 
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content, when it gains the knowledge or awareness of illegal activity.13 The latter is the starting 
point for the liability exemption regime for hosting providers of the E-Commerce Directive and 
the notice-and-takedown regime.14 It is also one conceptual starting point for a fourth expedited 
model that relies on specific third parties, so-called “trusted notifiers” or “trusted flaggers”. 
A trusted notifier-system refers according to the European Commission to a mechanism, 
where a privileged notification channel is provided by an intermediary to a third party, which 
is particularly knowledgeable or has particular expertise to identify unlawful content.15 Under 
the respective conditions of these mechanisms, the notifier can request the takedown of, for 
example, content on a website or the domain name without judiciary involvement in the initial 
takedown, which in turn regularly is open to judicial review. 
Examples for such notifiers range from individual or organized networks of private 
organizations, civil society organizations and semi-public bodies, to public authorities. Today, 
there exist several models for non-judicial content takedowns based on trusted notifier-akin 
arrangements, oftentimes corresponding to industry sectors or types of content.16 On the 
European level, for example, the Internal Referral Unit of Europol since July 2015 identifies 
content related to terrorist and violent extremist propaganda and refers relevant content to 
Internet service providers.17 The International Association of Internet Hotlines (INHOPE) 
provides hotlines for reporting child abuse material and promises quick and effective content 
removal in collaboration with industry and law enforcement.18 Related systems exist with 
specialized civil society organizations or semi-public bodies regarding illegal hate speech, such 
as racist or xenophobic content.19 Similar arrangements are also in place at the national level: 
in Denmark, since 2005, a voluntary content filtering regime is in place for child sexual abuse 
material, based on a collaboration between the Danish National Police, non-governmental 
organization Save the Children (Red Barnet) and the majority of Internet access service 
providers.20 Also online platforms have engaged in voluntary measures, for example, a Code of 
Conduct countering illegal hate speech by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and Youtube 
 
13 Cf. Article 14 (1) E-Commerce Directive. According to Article 14(1) lit. b of the E-Commerce Directive, an online 
hosting platform is shielded from liability for the information stored by a user under the condition that “the provider, 
upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.” 
14 On notice and takedown procedures in the context of counterfeit goods see e.g. Knud Wallberg, ‘Notice and 
takedown of counterfeit goods in the Digital Single Market: a balancing of fundamental rights’ (2017) 12 Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law and Practice 922, 924ff and in the context of ISPs see Clement Salung Petersen and 
Thomas Riis, ‘Private enforcement of IP law by internet service providers: notice and action procedures’ in Thomas 
Riis (ed), User Generated Law, Re-Constructing Intellectual Property Law in a Knowledge Society (Edward Elgar 
2016), 228–251. 
15 See European Commission, ‘Tackling Illegal Content Online’ (Communication) COM(2017) 555 final, 8. 
16 Child sexual abuse content, for example, is prominently addressed. Perplexingly, Moore et al. (2009) found that 
child sexual abuse websites “are removed much more slowly than almost any other type of unlawful content.” see 
Tyler Moore, Richard Clayton, Ross Anderson, ‘The Economics of Online Crime’ (2009) 23 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 3, 16. 
17 See Europol, ‘Europol’s internet referral unit to combat terrorist and violent extremist content’ (Press release, 1 
July 2015) <www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol’s-internet-referral-unit-to-combat-terrorist-and-
violent-extremist-propaganda> accessed 24 October 2018. On the UK schemes related to terrorist material and 
extreme pornography, see TJ McIntyre, “Internet Censorship in the United Kingdom: National Schemes and 
European Norms” in Lilian Edwards (ed.), Law, Policy and the Internet (Hart Publishing 2019) 291–330. 
18 See European Commission, above n 15, 8. 
19 Ibid. 
20 So-called ‘netfilterordning’, see <www.ft.dk/samling/20111/almdel/reu/spm/125/svar/851602/1069893.pdf> 
accessed 24 October 2018 (in Danish). Notably, the evaluation of content is at the discretion of the police and does 
not have to be based on a court order. 
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supported by the European Commission.21 In the domain name industry, too, the emergence 
of trusted notifier-models for content-related domain name remedies can be observed.22 
Generally, however, there is only very sparse public information available on these 
arrangements. This makes trusted notifiers a difficult phenomenon to study and to assess their 
use, accuracy, effectiveness or due process.  
On a general level, these models are argued to come with several advantages: compared 
to notifications by ‘regular’ users, the European Commission notes as benefits of trusted 
notifiers “higher quality notices and faster take-downs”, refraining, however, from further 
specifying the quality improvements of notices.23 In other words, the mechanism is argued to 
lead to a higher efficiency in the notice-and-takedown regime based on an expedited process. 
Thus, a principle purpose of implementing such measures is to increase the efficiency of 
enforcement over ‘regular’ notice-and-takedown channels. Regularly, intermediaries are lacking 
the competence and resources to evaluate the legality of content24; trusted notifiers, on the 
other hand, so it is presumed, have exactly that competence.25 In the example of intellectual 
property (IP) rights infringements, rights holders, for example, have information about 
protected works and whether they are licensed or not, an information that the intermediary 
regularly lacks. Husovec argues that “under some circumstances even a right holder can be the 
sole cheapest-cost avoider”, namely in instances where rights holders have access to a removal 
interface.26  
There is little information about the costs of such trusted notifier arrangements. On the 
intermediaries’ side, they are likely to depend on existing process and technologies for the 
handling of notices. On the notifier side, right holders and other parties will regularly only 
push for such mechanisms, where a faster takedown is perceived beneficial compared to the 
pre-existing regime. Already today, different parties such as rights holders or interest 
organizations screen content. In any case, implementation costs are likely smaller compared to 
e.g. the introduction of automated filtering mechanisms. The incentives for intermediaries to 
engage in trusted-notifier models can be manifold. As a starting point stands an extension of 
the notice-and-takedown regime based on the respective legislative frameworks, secondary 
liability questions and preliminary injunctions.27 Trusted notifier systems might also be able to 
reduce the risk of court proceedings. Legal uncertainty and other considerations might be a 
driver too, as examples from the domain name industry will show.  
 
21 European Commission, ‘EU Internet Forum: Bringing together governments, Europol and technology companies 
to counter terrorist content and hate speech online’ (Press release, 3 December 2015) IP/15/6243. See also Lilian 
Edwards, ‘“With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility?”: The Rise of Platform Liability’ in Lilian Edwards 
(ed.), Law, Policy and the Internet (Hart Publishing 2019), 271–272. 
22 See in detail the examples below. 
23 Empirical research has displayed the varying validity of copyright-related takedown notices, see e.g. JM Urban, 
J Karaganis and BL Schonfeld, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice (Berkeley Law 2016). 
24 See e.g. Aleksandra Kuczerawy, ‘Intermediary liability & freedom of expression: Recent developments in the EU 
notice & action initiative’ (2015) 48 Computer Law & Security Review 46, 48. 
25 Husovec, above n 10, 36, for example, makes the point in context IP rights and “contextual infringements”, where 
“identification and determination of such infringements requires knowledge of (1) societal circumstances (…) (2) 
external public information (…) (3) confidential information”, that right holders are better positioned to identify 
infringing content. 
26 Husovec, above n 10, 37. 
27 See e.g. Matthias Leistner, Structural aspects of secondary (provider) liability in Europe, Journal of Intellectual 
Property Law & Practice, 2014, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 75–90 and the big study. 
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At the same time, there exist concerns when enforcement arrangements are not based 
on a legal basis but voluntary codes or contractual arrangements as regards, for example, 
legitimacy, rule of law, transparency and control mechanisms that prevent excessive or unlawful 
takedown mechanisms. These concerns are aggravated by a principal–agent relation between 
intermediary and notifier. Thus, the efficiency gain comes at a cost. These will be discussed in 
the sections below. 
 
3. Voluntary introduction of trusted notifier models at platform-level by means of soft 
law 
In recent years, the European lawmaker has primarily looked towards online platforms28 –i.e. 
the application layer– and their role in the regulation of content.29 For these intermediaries, it 
is regularly technically feasible to make unavailable the actual infringing content as such, i.e. 
without disabling the website as a whole. From a proportionality perspective, the appeal of 
measures restricted to the concrete infringing content is self-evident.  
Self-regulation plays an important role in the playbook for tackling illegal online content 
on online platforms: following an announcement in its Digital Single Market Strategy mid-term 
review, in September 2017, the European Commission presented non-binding guidelines and 
principles for online platforms to increase the proactive prevention, detection and removal of 
illegal content inciting hatred, violence and terrorism online.30 Its Communication on “Tackling 
Illegal Content Online, Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms” stipulates that 
regarding the detection and notification of illegal content 
“Online platforms should cooperate more closely with competent national authorities, by 
appointing points of contact to ensure they can be contacted rapidly to remove illegal content. 
To speed up detection, online platforms are encouraged to work closely with trusted flaggers, 
i.e. specialised entities with expert knowledge on what constitutes illegal content. Additionally, 
they should establish easily accessible mechanisms to allow users to flag illegal content and to 
invest in automatic detection technologies.”31 
 
28 The uniform notion “online platform” is not unproblematic: the European Parliament, for example, points towards 
difficulties of a single definition of online platform, given the variety of platforms. Instead, the Parliament proposes 
to distinguish and defines platforms (...) “in relevant sector-specific legislation at EU level according to their 
characteristics, classifications and principles and following a problem-driven approach.” (See European Parliament, 
Resolution of 15 June 2017 on online platforms and the digital single market (2016/2276(INI)). See also Andrej 
Savin, ‘Regulating internet platforms in the EU - The emergence of the “Level playing Field”’ (2018) 34 Computer 
Law & Security Review 1215. 
29 In relation to copyright-protected works, the Commission suggested, for example, the introduction of a monitoring 
obligation for certain information society service providers and effectively introducing a notice and stay-down 
regime, see above n 4. Similarly, in May 2016, the Commission proposed a rule on (technical) measures to restrict 
access to harmful content by minors in, see Article 12 of European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions 
laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual 
media services in view of changing market realities’ COM(2016) 287 final. 
30 European Commission, ‘Security Union: Commission steps up efforts to tackle illegal content online’ (Press release, 
28 September 2017) IP/17/3493. Also to be seen in context of European Parliament, above n 28, e.g. point 34. 
Notably, the press release does not mention copyright-related infringements, whereas the underlying communication 
refers to copyright-related infringements at several points. 
31 Ibid, emphasis added. The Communication “strongly recommends” online platforms to prevent the re-appearance 
of illegal content by using automation technologies, effectively reiterating the Commission’s policy choice for 
proactive filtering technologies beyond the copyright vertical. 
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The Commission anticipated online platforms to “proactively implement the guidelines” 
and aimed at tracking the progress until May 2018 before considering to introduce 
accompanying legislative measures complementing the existing framework. Already on 1 March 
2018, the Commission followed up with a soft law tool: Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 on 
measures to effectively tackle illegal content online.32 This Recommendation follows a 
horizontal approach addressing both all types of illegal content (Chapter 2) and terrorist 
content (Chapter 3) and is directed towards both Member States and hosting service 
providers.33 According to Chapter 1, para. 4 lit. b, ‘illegal content’ “means any information 
which is not in compliance with Union law or the law of a Member State concerned”. The broad 
scope is to be seen towards the horizontal scope of the E-Commerce Directive34 but is 
noteworthy towards the background of the Commission’s earlier statements that different types 
of illegal content would “require different policy approaches in respect of notice-and-action 
procedures.”35 
In the Recommendation, the introduction of systems akin to trusted notifiers is foreseen 
in two dimensions: for non-state private actors and for public authorities. In line with the 
Commission’s preceding Communication, it suggests: 
“Cooperation between hosting service providers and trusted flaggers should be encouraged. In 
particular, fast-track procedures should be provided to process notices submitted by trusted 
flaggers.“36 
Such trusted flagger is defined in point 4 lit. g as “an individual or entity which is 
considered by a hosting service provider to have particular expertise and responsibilities for 
the purposes of tackling illegal content online”. Secondly, the Recommendation also foresees 
privileged notice channels for public authorities, namely in point 23 where it stipulates that 
“[f]ast-track procedures should be provided to process notices submitted by competent 
authorities.” 
Let us recall that the Recommendation is directed towards Member States and hosting 
service providers. Interestingly, the Commission envisions a –potentially considerable– 
expansion of scope of the proposed solutions though: in Recital 15, it recalls that online hosting 
service providers play a “particularly important role in tackling illegal content online” and that 
the Recommendation “therefore primarily relates to the activities and responsibilities of those 
providers”. The Recital continues that “[h]owever, where appropriate, the recommendations 
made can also be applied, mutatis mutandis, in relation to other affected online services 
providers.” The Recommendation refrains from defining these ‘online service providers’ and 
providing guidance or examples, potentially leaving a wide discretion to Member States and 
affected services. It seems, however, that the envisioned model is the Commission’s preferred 
 
32 Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 of 1 March 2018 on measures to effectively tackle illegal content 
online C/2018/1177 [2018] OJ L 63/50. 
33 Such ‘hosting service provider’ is defined in Chapter 1 para. 4 lit. a as “a provider of information society services 
consisting of the storage of information provided by the recipient of the service at his or her request, within the 
meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC, irrespective of its place of establishment, which directs its activities 
to consumers residing in the Union”. 
34 See Recital 14 of Recommendation (EU) 2018/334. 
35 European Commission, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market, Opportunities and Challenges for Europe’ 
(Communication) COM(2016) 288 final. 
36 Chapter 2, point 25 of Recommendation (EU) 2018/334, emphasis added. 
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solution for potentially a wide variety of Internet intermediaries. I will come back to this 
observation when looking at the specific intermediary case of domain registries.  
A Recommendation is by its very nature a weak instrument vis-à-vis a Directive or 
Regulation. In relation to terrorist content, Jean-Claude Juncker justified a proposal for 
Regulation on terrorist content in its State of the Union speech from September 2018 with the 
observation that the recommendations from March 2018 “have brought positive results, overall 
progress has not been sufficient.”37 In relation to other forms of illegal content, no follow-up 
legislation has been proposed so far, but another assessment (and potentially opening) of the 
E-Commerce Directive’s regime during the 2019–2024 Commission cycle in form of a Digital 
Services Act appears to be on the legislative agenda.38 
 
4. Mitigating issues of privatized enforcement I: should we trust a notifier? 
Privatized enforcement has generally been associated with a variety of issues related to, for 
example, the rule of law, legal certainty, accountability, democracy deficit, presumption of 
innocence, right to due process, and potentially right to privacy and freedom of speech and 
communication.39 A central issue of trusted notifier relates to their legitimacy.40 One approach 
defines legitimacy as a “(…) generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity 
are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed systems of norms, values, 
beliefs and definitions.”41 In my view, legitimacy in the context of these trusted notifier-models, 
is partly about being representative, something which can be seen in some of the referred 
examples: public authorities, for example (such as police), enjoy general trust and gained 
legitimacy in that they form an essential part of the state and are subject to (democratic) 
oversight. Another example are organizations that can be specifically representative on a 
knowledge level (e.g. children protection organisation) or given a special legitimation (e.g. 
rights holders’ societies). Likely it is often representatives of involved parties that are especially 
knowledgeable, think for example of an industry organization. In those instances, however, a 
principal–agent problem is inherent: the agent, i.e. the trusted notifier and in the example, the 
industry organization, has a primary interest in making infringing content unavailable. 
Whereas we can assume that the principal, i.e. the intermediary, shares a similar goal, the 
interests of the intermediary are likely to embrace more diverse and differentiated objectives 
that go beyond the mere inaccessibility of the respective, allegedly illegal content. This could 
lead to situations, where the equilibrium between interests balances out at the principal-level, 
whereas it is more biased towards a certain result at the agent-level. Child protection 
organisations or rights holders’ societies, for example, could be more willing to accept a higher 
 
37 European Commission, ‘State of the Union 2018: Commission proposes new rules to get terrorist content off the 
web’, Press release, IP/18/5561, Strasbourg, 12 September 2018 < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-
5561_en.htm> 
38 See leaked note: European Commission, Digital Service Act note DG Connect June 2019, < 
https://cdn.netzpolitik.org/wp-upload/2019/07/Digital-Services-Act-note-DG-Connect-June-2019.pdf> 
39 See e.g. European Digital Rights (EDRi), ‘Human Rights and privatised law enforcement’ (25 February 2014), 3 
<https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/EDRi_HumanRights_and_PrivLaw_web.pdf>; Angelopoulos et 
al., above n 10. For a discussion of legitimacy of institutions in the context of ICANN, see Pierre Mounier, ‘Internet 
governance and the question of legitimacy’, in Eric Brousseau, Meryem Marzouki and Cécile Méadel, Governance, 
Regulations and Powers on the Internet (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 170–185. 
40 For a discussion on legitimacy in the Internet Governance context see also ‘Utility and Legitimacy Issues’ in Lee 
A Bygrave, Internet Governance by Contract (Oxford University Press, 2015) 133–136. 
41 Mark C Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches’ (2005) 20 Academy of 
Management Rev, 571, 574 cited in Bygrave, above n 40, 134. 
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false positive rate because their main interest is the unavailability of certain content. In other 
words, situations where the agent wants to enforce “as much as possible”, whereas the principal 
wants to enforce “as much as necessary”.42 Additionally, trusted notifier-models inherently come 
with a stark information asymmetry: the whole point of these arrangement is that the agent, 
i.e. the notifier, is more knowledgeable than the principal. Thus, for the presumption effect of 
notices by trusted notifiers to be legitimate, certain safeguards are necessary in order to 
mitigate the principal–agent problem. 
But not only legitimacy depends on the assessment of whether the models involve non-
state private actors or public authorities: this distinction impacts on the set of rules with which 
the models need to comply. Many constitutional duties or human rights only directly obligate 
States, not private companies.43 Thus, private entities “can impose (and be “encouraged” to 
impose) restrictions on access to information without being subject to the constitutional or 
international law constraints that apply to state limitations of the right to freedom of 
expression”.44 This makes for a difficult assessment in instances where arrangements between 
private actors are facilitated or endorsed by public authorities. In the context of blocking 
decisions by private actors this can, in the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Commissioner for Human 
Rights’ view, lead  
“(…) to a situation in which access to selected websites for the vast majority of the population 
is determined, not on the basis of public law, but on the basis of decisions by private-law 
entities that are not directly subject to human rights law. In particular, ISPs can stipulate in 
their general terms and conditions that they are free to decide, by themselves, whether to 
block access to specific sites if they deem those sites (at their own discretion) to be contrary 
to company policies.”45 
This issue is of course not restricted to expedited trusted notifier-models. The CoE’s 
Committee of Ministers, for example, addressed this issue in its Declaration on ICANN, human 
rights and the rule of law from 2015 arguing that human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
internet users “should prevail over the general terms and conditions of service of private-sector 
Internet companies and the technical mandates of specialised entities, such as the Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).”46 In a similar vein, albeit more 
reserved, also the European Commission in its Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 foresees that 
“(…) decisions taken by hosting service providers to remove or disable access to content 
which they store should take due account of the fundamental rights and the legitimate 
interests of their users as well as of the central role which those providers tend to play in 
 
42 Borrowed from Husovec, above n 10, 50. 
43 Cf. European Convention of Human Rights, EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. See Christina Angelopoulos et al. above n 10; see also United Nations, Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘An Open Letter to States Concerning an International Legally Binding 
Instrument on Business and Human Rights’ (2018) 
<www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Development/IEDebt/OpenLettertoStates_1Oct2018.pdf> accessed 13 
December 2018; Emily B. Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate 
Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 84–85. 
44 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 6, 16. 
45 Ibid, 70. 
46 Council of Europe, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on ICANN, human rights and the rule of law, 
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 June 2015 at the 1229th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies), point 
4. 
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facilitating public debate and the distribution and reception of facts, opinions and ideas in 
accordance with the law.”47 
Thus, the also Recommendation foresees an application of fundamental rights 
intermediaries to some extent. Given the absence of specific secondary legislation, this section 
focuses on sketching the outlines of the framework by relying on the European Commission’s 
Recommendation and various documents by the Council of Europe (CoE) and the United 
Nations (UN), which have addressed associated drawbacks and put forward suggestions for 
their mitigation. 
 
The necessity of a legal basis for non-judicial enforcement regimes 
Especially in the context of non-judicial enforcement and the involvement of state 
actors, the rule of law becomes relevant.48 In March 2018, the CoE Committee of Ministers 
adopted a Recommendation on the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries.49 In its 
appendix on the Guidelines for States on actions taken vis-à-vis internet intermediaries, it 
recommends that: 
“Any request, demand or other action by public authorities addressed to internet 
intermediaries that interferes with human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be prescribed 
by law, exercised within the limits conferred by law and constitute a necessary and 
proportionate measure in a democratic society. States should not exert pressure on internet 
intermediaries through non-legal means.”50 
Especially, the second sentence in the cited paragraph is interesting: my reading is that 
the Committee of Ministers is quite aware of the non-legislative influence that public actors 
enjoy. To me, the use of a Recommendation, which is non-binding but encouraging to comply 
under the threat of potential legislative measures in case of non-compliance, represents almost 
a prototype of the situation, which the CoE discourages. Thus, the European Commission’s 
push regarding privileged channels based on a soft law tool51 seems at odds with the CoE’s 
guidelines. At the same time, it is questionable whether actions based on the Commission’s 
(more or less) clear input regarding non-law based enforcement mechanisms would even qualify 
as voluntary actions by private actors.52 In light of new modes of governance and in the context 
of the Commission’s Better Regulation Agenda, non-law-based interventions operate side by 
side with, or instead of, legislative interventions.53 Against this background, I find it 
unconvincing to qualify models that are based on soft law as voluntary private actions. 
 
47 Recital 13 of Recommendation (EU) 2018/334, last sentence, emphasis added. 
48 See also Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 6, 43. 
49 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, CM/Rec(2018)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member States on 
the roles and responsibilities of internet intermediaries (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 7 March 2018 
at the 1309th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies). The Committee is the primary decision body of the CoE; its 
recommendations are not binding to the Member States. 
50 Appendix, point 1.1.1, emphasis added. 
51 See Article 288 TFEU. 
52 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 6, 14. 
53 See David M Trubek, Patrick Cottrell and Mark Nance, ‘“Soft Law”, “Hard Law” and EU Integration’ in Gráinne 
de Búrca and Joanne Scott (eds), Law and Governance in the EU and the US (Hart Publishing 2006) 65; Rob van 
Gestel and Hans-W. Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What About Methodology?’ in Ulla 
Neergaard, Ruth Nielsen and Lynn Roseberry (eds), European Legal Method - Pardoxes and Revitalisation (DJØF 
Publishing 2011) 46; Stephen Weatherill, ‘The Challenge of Better Regulation’ in Stephen Weatherill (ed), Better 
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The situation looks somewhat different for private actors. In 2011, the United Nations’ 
Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression, recommended (private) intermediaries in a catalogue to  
“only implement restrictions to these rights after judicial intervention; be transparent to the 
user involved about measures taken, and where applicable to the wider public; provide, if 
possible, forewarning to users before the implementation of restrictive measures; and minimize 
the impact of restrictions strictly to the content involved. Finally, there must be effective 
remedies for affected users, including the possibility of appeal through the procedures provided 
by the intermediary and by a competent judicial authority.”54 
In my reading, the Special Rapporteur’s position from 2011 leaves little room for 
restrictions based on non-judicial takedowns arrangements. In a similar vein, in 2014, also the 
CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights recommended in an issue paper regarding blocking and 
filtering that: 
“Member states should ensure that any restrictions on access to Internet content affecting 
users under their jurisdiction are based on a strict and predictable legal framework regulating 
the scope of any such restrictions and affording the guarantee of judicial oversight to prevent 
possible abuses. In addition, domestic courts must examine whether any blocking measure is 
necessary, effective and proportionate, and in particular whether it is targeted enough so as 
to impact only on the specific content that requires blocking. 55 
Furthermore, the Commissioner underlined that states “should not rely on or encourage 
private actors (…) to carry out blocking outside a framework meeting the criteria described 
above.” 56 Thus, also in a private actor-setting, the predictability of the legal framework and 
judicial involvement regarding the assessment of specific blocking measures constitute key 
concerns. In other words, also regarding private action, the European Commission’s soft law 
approach appears to be at odds with the CoE’s Commissioner’s view. More recently, however, 
in 2018, the CoE’s Committee of Ministers, has once more visited their stance on responsibilities 
of internet intermediaries. It stipulates that 
 “Any interference by intermediaries with the free and open flow of information and ideas (…) 
should be based on clear and transparent policies and be limited to specific legitimate 
purposes, such as restricting access to illegal content, as determined either by law or by a 
judicial authority or other independent administrative authority whose decisions are subject 
to judicial review, or in accordance with their own content-restriction policies or codes of 
ethics, which may include flagging mechanisms.”57 
Thus, it appears that the recent position of the CoE Committee of Ministers is much 
more favorable of intermediaries’ own content takedown policies than in earlier positions. 
 
Regulation (Hart Publishing 2007) 47;Benoît Frydman, Ludovic Hennebel and Gregory Lewkowicz, “Co-regulation 
and the rule of law”, in Eric Brousseau, Meryem Marzouki and Cécile Méadel (eds.), Governance, Regulations and 
Powers on the Internet (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 133–150. 
54 United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, 16 May 2011, A/HRC/17/27, point 
47, 14. 
55 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 6, point 16, emphasis added. 
56 Ibid., point 17, emphasis added. 
57 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, above n 49, Section 2 on Responsibilities of internet intermediaries 
with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms, point 2.1.3, emphasis added. 
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Towards the background of large amounts of unlawful content and intermediaries’ gate-keeper 
function, this seems a practical and result-oriented view. Yet, there exist concerns as to the 
privatization of enforcement. The question is then, how these concerns can be mitigated. 
 
5. Mitigating issues of privatized enforcement II: when to trust a notifier? 
In the following, I will look at a few aspects, where the mitigation of negative effects is especially 
relevant: the selection of trusted notifiers, transparency and control mechanisms, and the risk 
of over-removal. The section takes its starting point in the only instrument directly addressing 
trusted notifiers at the EU-level at this time, Recommendation (EU) 2018/334.  
 
Selection of trusted notifiers 
When we consider the legitimacy aspects and the inherit principal-agent problem 
discussed above, one central aspect relates to the selection of trusted notifiers. Who should be 
able to appoint these actors and under what standards? Conceptually, the selection of a trusted 
notifier is a positive discrimination of certain actors. In point 26, the Recommendation 
encourages online platforms “to publish clear and objective conditions for determining which 
individuals or entities they consider as trusted flaggers.” Thus, the Commission effectively 
proposes that online platforms themselves determine who is to be seen a trusted flagger. The 
selection conditions are further specified in point 27, where it is held that they “should aim to 
ensure that the individuals or entities concerned have the necessary expertise and carry out 
their activities as trusted flaggers in a diligent and objective manner, based on respect for the 
values on which the Union is founded.”58 The Recommendation further stipulates in Recital 29 
that such “[c]ooperation should only be open to individuals and entities which respect the values 
on which the Union is founded as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and 
meet certain appropriate conditions, which should moreover be clear and objective and be made 
publicly available.” There is special emphasis on the respect of the values on which the EU is 
founded, namely “human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common 
to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” 
Thus, there are indeed some broad suggested selection criteria. Their very existence 
underlines the importance of the selection process. Effectively, however, it is left to the 
individual platform to refine the abstract set of values and define the concrete criteria that a 
trusted notifier needs to meet. Another, related question is how to select trusted notifiers in 
cross-border situations, which are inherent to these platforms. Finally, there is also little 
guidance on whether the selection of trusted notifiers is a one-time accreditation process or 
rather an iterative process whether the privilege is monitored and can be withdrawn, for 
example when quality of notices is low or abuse is taking place.  
 
Transparency and control mechanisms 
Public and administrative law and principles do as a starting point not infuse private 
mechanisms. There exists no requirement for private measures to offer procedural due process 
safeguards comparable to those usually related to the granting of a preliminary injunction. 
 
58 Chapter 2, point 27 of Recommendation (EU) 2018/334. 
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Considering the empirical evidence on inaccurate takedown notices,59 this of concern. One 
mitigating means is the right to counter notices, e.g. prior to takedown and within a certain 
timeframe.60 
Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 contains several general safeguards, e.g. on 
transparency (points 16–17) and on the protection against abusive behavior, such as the 
submission of notices and counter-notices in bad faith (point 21), which relate both to private 
and public notifying parties. Additionally, the Recommendation foresees safeguards on the side 
of the hosting service provider in point 19 to “(…) act in a diligent and proportionate manner 
in respect of content that they store, in particular when processing notices and counter-notices 
and when deciding on the possible removal of or disabling of access to content considered to 
be illegal”.  
 
Risk of rubber-stamping and over-removal 
Trusted notifiers models are appealing because the system, at its surface, solves a 
problem related to the competence to decide often difficult legal questions on the legality of 
content. This is recognized by Recital 29 of Commission Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 
which stipulates that notices submitted by such parties should be treated “(…) as a matter of 
priority and with an appropriate degree of confidence as regards their accuracy”. It is, however, 
unclear what an appropriate degree would be and to what extent and how an intermediary is 
to evaluate the accuracy.  
In this principal–agent situation there exists a risk of rubberstamp-accepting takedown 
notices by trusted notices leading to over-compliance and excessive content takedown, in 
situations where intermediaries, for example, seek to avoid legal repercussion for failure to act 
on a received notice.61 Furthermore, for example in the case IP rights, if there exist no sanctions 
for over-removal, rights holders “will rely on automation” for any kind of infringement62, even 
in instances, where automation is expected to lead to high false-positives. Empirical evidence 
underlines the tendency of over-removal by intermediaries.63 This concern is aggravated 
towards the background that government agencies, interest organizations and rightholders are 
more likely to file a lawsuit than the infringer and when the intermediary possesses limited 
resources or competences to evaluate the situation.64 Given the privileged takedown channel, 
safeguards are necessary to ensure that a notifier continues to deliver high quality notices and 
false positives are held low in the long run. It has been suggested before, for example, that 
“automated submission should be available only under the condition of extremely low margin 
of errors and allow intermediaries to temporarily terminate the access to it when the condition 
 
59 See Daphne Keller, ‘Empirical Evidence of “Over-Removal” by Internet Companies under Intermediary Liability 
Laws’ (Stanford University, The Center for Internet & Society, 12 October 2015) 
<http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/10/empirical-evidence-over-removal-internet-companies-under-
intermediary-liability-laws> accessed 23 October 2018. 
60 See e.g. Husovec, above n 10, 73, with reference to Jennifer Urban and Laura Quilter, ‘Efficient Process or 
“Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’ (2006) 22 Santa 
Clara Computer and High Technology Law Journal 621, 689. 
61 See also Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights, above n 6, 70. 
62 Husovec, above n 10, 45. 
63 See Keller, above n 59. 
64 See also Internet & Jurisdiction, ‘Domains & Jurisdiction Program: Cross-Border Domain Suspension, Problem 
Framing’ (May 2017) 5 <https://www.internetjurisdiction.net/uploads/pdfs/Papers/Domains-Jurisdiction-
Program-Paper.pdf> accessed 13 December 2018. 
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is violated”.65 Yet, there appear to be few safeguards in the European playbook that mitigate 
this risk at this point.  
In conclusion, it seems that the European Commission’s approach in the 
Recommendation leaves many questions unaddressed and provides only a vague, and non-
binding template.  
  
 
6. Turning towards an odd example: content-related domain name takedowns 
Let us now turn towards the case of content or use-related domain name takedowns.66 Domain 
names facilitate the access to content by translating IP addresses into mnemonic codes. These 
situations are special in that not the allegedly infringing content is taken down, but rather the 
accessibility to the website via a domain name as such disabled. The major difference of domain 
name vis-à-vis platform takedowns relates thus inter alia to proportionality in that the access 
to the website via the respective domain name as a whole (including e-mail) disappears. Looking 
at domain names might seem odd at first, when considering the regulatory focus on online 
platforms and other intermediaries, which are closer to the content. Yet, this section will reveal 
that trusted notifier-akin regimes indeed are used in the industry but appear to be overlooked 
by the regulator. 
 
6.1 Traditional sources for domain name takedowns 
Before looking at voluntary forms of content-related domain name takedowns, it is helpful to 
briefly sketch traditional sources for domain name takedowns: in the majority cases instances 
the takedown of a domain name is related to the domain name as such, such as in the case of 
trademark infringements.67 Many country-code top-level (ccTLD) domain name registries and 
generic top-level (gTLD) domain name registries have different processes and rules in place, 
oftentimes based on the ICANN framework. Already in 2001, for example, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) issued its ‘ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention 
and Resolution of Intellectual Property Disputes’.68 The takedown of domain names related to 
its use, on the other hand, regularly finds its basis either in court orders or in specific 
legislation.69 
First and foremost, a domain registry can be obliged to suspend a domain name on the 
basis of a court order subject to the respective national procedural rules. In Denmark, for 
example, the national ccTLD registry has received 1.025 court orders to suspend domains in 
 
65 Husovec, above n 10, 73. 
66 On domain registries and their role regarding unlawful content see Maarten Truyens and Patrick Van Eecke, 
‘Liability of Domain Name Registries: Don’t Shoot the Messenger’ (2016) 32 Computer Law & Security Review 327 
and Schwemer, above n 12. 
67 An example would be the domain name <www.rolex-watches.dk> by a registrant that is not entitled to use the 
trademark. 
68 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), ‘ccTLD Best Practices for the Prevention and Resolution of 
Intellectual Property Disputes’ (Version 1: June 20, 2001), <www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/bestpractices/> 
accessed 13 December 2018. 
69 On the legislative frameworks and practices regarding blocking, filtering and takedown of illegal content in the 
forty-seven Council of Europe Member States, see the comprehensive comparative study commissioned by the 
Council of Europe: Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, ‘Comparative Study on Blocking, Filtering and Take-Down 
of Illegal Internet Content’ (Lausanne, 2015). 
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2017 and 1.021 in the first six months of 2018 alone.70 Another noteworthy case is the seizure 
of more than 4.500 domain names of websites which sold counterfeit products, in a concerted 
effort by Europol in the operation ‘In our Sites’.71 Court orders, directed both at domain 
registries and/or other intermediaries, have become a frequently used measure by both 
rightholders and public prosecutors. 
There exist also other secondary, partly sectoral, legislation or proposals, which could 
provide a basis for the use-related takedown of a domain name. The European Commission’s 
proposal for a Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation from May 201672, for example, 
stipulated in Article 8 (2) lit. l that the competent national authority shall have at least the 
power to inter alia “close down a website, domain or similar digital site, service or account or 
a part of it, including by requesting a third party or other public authority to implement such 
measures” under certain conditions.73 Directive 2011/92/EU on combating sexual abuse and 
sexual exploitation of children and child pornography in Article 25(1) introduced an obligation 
on Member States to “take the necessary measures to ensure the prompt removal of web pages 
containing or disseminating child pornography hosted in their territory and to endeavor to 
obtain the removal of such pages hosted outside of their territory.”74 In relation to terrorist 
content, Directive (EU) 2017/5475 regulates in Article 21 (1) and (2) on “Measures against 
public provocation content online” that Member States shall take the necessary measures to 
ensure the prompt removal or blocking of such content. Also, national legislation is in some 
instances addressing domain name takedowns (e.g. Switzerland76 or proposal in Denmark77). 
 
70 DK Hostmaster for example provides the Danish police and other public authorities with guidelines on how to 
request data from the registry, see <www.dk-hostmaster.dk/en/release-data-police> accessed 13 December 2018. 
The legal basis for preliminary injunctions in Denmark is found in the general rules, section 314 of the Danish 
Administration of Justice Act. 
71 See Europol, ‘Operation In Our Sites (IOS)’ <www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/europol-in-
action/operations/operation-in-our-sites-ios> accessed 24 October 2018. 
72 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws’ COM(2016) 283 final.  
73 Notably in the Council’s general approach, references in Article 3 to website and domain names were deleted. 
The CPC Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of consumer protection laws and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 [2017] OJ L 345/1) can be 
seen as a tendency for how the takedown at the domain-name level is coming into the focus. Also in the proposed 
Regulation laying down rules and procedures for compliance with and enforcement of Union harmonisation 
legislation on products, COM(2017) 795 final, from 19 December 2017, a basis for takedown by market surveillance 
authorities. 
74 See e.g. Article 25 of Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 
on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council 
Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA [2011] OJ L 26/1. 
75 Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism 
and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending Council Decision 2005/671/JHA [2017] 
OJ L 88/6. 
76 The case of the regulation of <.ch> and <.swiss> top level-domains is interesting, as it constitutes one of the 
most comprehensive regulatory frameworks that also addresses the use of domain names for phishing or distribution 
of malware. See Bundesamt für Kommunikation (BAKOM), ‘Wirksamere Massnahmen zur Bekämpfung von 
Cyberkriminalität auf .ch- und .swiss-Websites‘ (press release, 15 September 2017) 
<www.bakom.admin.ch/bakom/de/home/das-bakom/medieninformationen/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-
68117.html> accessed 24 October 2018. 
77 In Denmark, the government in 2016 proposed an amendment to the Administration of Justice Act that would 
have allowed police to take down domains for any violation of its penal code. After severe public backlash the 
proposal was amended to only cover certain violations related to terror. 
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Let it suffice here to note that several more or less specific rules are in place for the takedown 
or blocking of content.  
 
6.2 Emergence of mechanisms for content-related takedown of domain names 
In the, up until recently, absence of regulation by traditional governmental actors in the domain 
name space, it is interesting to consult the stance of the multi-stakeholder governance 
organization Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). ICANN has 
established a system for the resolution of disputes stemming from abusive registration and use 
of domain names as such in its Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDPR)78, 
which is applied by registrars. It does not contain redress related to the unlawful activity on 
the underlying website. In 2015, ICANNs Chief Contract Compliance Officer stated:  
 “Allow me to say this clearly and succinctly – ICANN is not a global regulator of Internet 
content (...) ICANN was never granted, nor was it ever intended that ICANN be granted, the 
authority to act as a regulator of Internet content.”79  
This position seems to not be that clear-cut anymore. At recent ICANN meetings, for 
example, questions on DNS and content regulation have been featured prominently on the 
agenda.80 Bridy (2017) comments that ICANN supports “voluntary enforcement agreements 
between DNS intermediaries and right holders (…).”81 
Regularly, given the contractual relations between registry, registrar and registrant, it 
is these contracts that provide the basis for the takedown of domain names. The respective 
domain registry can regulate, to a varying degree, mechanisms in their terms of conditions, 
which every registrant accepts when entering into a contract with the registry. Thus, an 
indication for the industry’s stance can also be derived from to what extent there exists a 
contractual basis for the takedown of a domain name for content- or use-related reasons. 
Brenden et al. (2017) examined the registrars’ terms of service of 74 ICANN contracted parties 
(accounting for 90% of all gTLD domain registrations worldwide) for morality clauses that give 
domain registrars the right to cancel domains for content-related reasons.82 In their empirical 
study they found that around 59% of registrars employ such clause. Also, some ccTLDs appear 
to reserve the right to terminate the domain name agreement with a registrant for use- or 
content-related reasons.83 There exists however, little insight as to whether these provisions –
and if so, in what situations– have been used. 
 
78 Available at <www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en> accessed 13 December 2018. 
79 Allen R Grogan, ‘ICANN Is Not the Internet Content Police’, (ICANN Blog, 12 Jun 2015) < 
www.icann.org/news/blog/icann-is-not-the-internet-content-police> accessed 24 October 2018. 
80 See e.g. ICANN57 High Interest Topics Review Page, <https://meetings.icann.org/en/hitreviews>  
81 Annemarie Bridy, ‘Notice and Takedown in the Domain Name System: ICANN's Ambivalent Drift into Online 
Content Regulation’ (2017) 20 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2920805> 
82 Brenden Kuerbis, Ishan Mehta, Milton Mueller, ‘In Search of Amoral Registrars: Content Regulation and Domain 
Name Policy’ (2017) Internet Governance Project White Paper, Georgia Tech <www.internetgovernance.org/wp-
content/uploads/AmoralReg-PAPER-final.pdf> accessed 12 March 2018; see section 3.18 of ICANN Registrar 
Accreditation Agreement. See also Caroline Bricteux, ‘Regulating Online Content through the Internet Architecture’ 
(2016) Journal of Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Electronic Commerce Law 229. 
83 The terms and conditions of the Austrian and German ccTLD registry, nic.at and DENIC, for example, do not 
provide directly clauses related to a termination of contract based on the content accessible under the domain name. 
Interestingly, however, both terms refer to a termination for “important reasons” (“wichtiger Grund”) and come with 
a list of examples, indicated by “in particular” (“insbesondere”). 
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Today, there exist different models for the non-judicial takedown, some of which are 
addressing websites as such whereas others target specific forms of content (e.g. related to ordre 
public such as child abuse material, terrorism, vis-a-vis counterfeit or IP violations). 
There are examples of trusted notifier-akin arrangements between national ccTLD 
registries and public authorities. In the United Kingdom, for example, since 2014 the police 
and several other law enforcement agencies function akin to a trusted notifier to the local 
ccTLD registry, NOMINET.84 Between November 2016 and October 2017, NOMINET received 
more than 16.000 takedown requests, whereof as many as 13.000 stemming from the UK’s 
Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU).85  
There is no information available whether or to what extent this model involving a public 
authority is based on a legal basis, as recommended by the CoE Committee of Ministers.86 
Takedown arrangements at the registry-level are not restricted to public agencies, 
however. There are also instances, where gTLD registries collaborate with private actors around 
trusted notifier models. In the United States, a trusted notifier scheme regarding copyright is 
practiced and envisioned by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIIA) respectively.87 In 2016, the domain registries 
Donuts and Radix which represent approximately 200 generic top-level domains such as 
<.movie> and <.tech>, introduced a trusted notifier regime with MPAA.88 Under this model 
“the MPAA can request the registries to take action against a domain name by presenting 
evidence that it has evidence that the domain name is being used for “clear and pervasive 
copyright infringement,” and that it has first attempted to contact the registrar and hosting 
provider for resolution.”89 The participating registries are required to respond within 10 days. 
It is being pointed out by the Electronic Frontier Foundation that there is no requirement that 
the registrant is notified of the takedown.90 In a similar vein, Bridy (2017) points towards 
various risks such as participating registries defaulting “to a rubber stamp approach.”91 
Another example for a broad private industry initiative is the Healthy Domain 
Initiative. In 2017, the Domain Name Association, an industry association consisting of several 
ccTLD, notably the Canadian and the Dutch ccTLD registry, and major gTLD registries as 
 
84 NOMINET, ‘Nominet formalises approach to tackling criminal activity on .UK domains’ (3 April 2014) 
<www.nominet.uk/nominet-formalises-approach-to-tackling-criminal-activity-on-uk-domains/> accessed 24 
October 2018. 
85 World Trademark Review, ‘Domain name suspensions in “.uk” TLD double as PIPCU takedown requests surge’ 
(15 November 2017) <www.worldtrademarkreview.com/Blog/Detail.aspx?g=bd1a428f-053b-4a15-b978-
994b6d7aaa2a> accessed 24 October 2018. See detailed analysis by Bridy, above n 82. 
86 See section 4 above. 
87 Bridy, above n 82, 20. 
88 Motion Picture Association of America, ‘MPAA/Radix Partnership Highlights Momentum Behind Voluntary 
Initiatives’ (Press release, 13 May 2017) <www.mpaa.org/new-mpaaradix-partnership-highlights-the-continuing-
momentum-of-voluntary-initiatives/> accessed 23 October 2018. Motion Picture Association of America, ‘Donuts 
and the MPAA establish new partnership to reduce online piracy’ (Press release, 9 February 2016) 
<www.mpaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Donuts-and-MPAA-Establish-New-Partnership-2.9.16.pdf> 
accessed 23 October 2018. 
89 Electronic Frontier Foundation, ‘Which Internet registries offer the best protection for domain owners?’ (27 July 
2017) 5 <www.eff.org/files/2017/08/02/domain_registry_whitepaper.pdf> accessed 23 October 2018. 
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well as registrars, proposed its ‘Registry / Registrar Healthy Practices’.92 Critically received93, 
the practices consists of recommendations relating to online security abuse such as malware, 
phishing and pharming; child abuse mitigation systems (e.g. trusted notifier systems); “rogue” 
online pharmacies; and voluntary third party handling of copyright infringement cases. In the 
context of child abuse, one of the primary recommendations relates to the establishment of 
trusted notifier systems, where “a party is pre-vetted (e.g. NCMEC, IWF, INHOPE) and 
recognized by the contracted party as capable of providing the relevant and complete evidence 
needed to take action against the registrant.”94 In the context of copyright infringement cases, 
the practices suggest the construction of a “voluntary framework for copyright infringement 
disputes, so copyright holders could use a more efficient and cost-effective system for clear 
cases of copyright abuse other than going to court and registries and registrars are not forced 
to act as “judges” and “jurors” on copyright complaints”.95 
Also the European ccTLD registry EURid, administering <.eu>, has as recently as 
June 2018 announced a collaboration with a private actor: a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC).96 The content of the MoU is, 
however, secret, and the parties did not respond for this research whether the agreement 
contains the establishment of a privileged access channel akin to trusted notifiers.  
Industry-led solutions in form of DNS-governance self-regulation in this sphere are 
partly welcomed.97 Others see in these models “a failure of the private governance processes 
associated with administration of the DNS.”98 There also exists evidence for the unjustified 
seizure of websites, based on information provided by the notifier.99 The multi-stakeholder 
policy network Internet & Jurisdiction notes that in relation to trusted notifier-models, 
“evaluations by notifiers are often established without sufficiently clear procedures or 
mechanisms for redress or may be based on the laws of only one particular country or the 
interest of trade associations.”100 As noted above, the Commission’s Recommendation from 1 
March 2018, does not directly address trusted notifier models outside hosting platforms. 
 
7. Discussion 
In this article, I have looked at the trend to rely on non-judicial takedown mechanisms in form 
of trusted notifier-models for unlawful websites and content. Whereas there is generally little 
empirical data available, we know that the European regulator –at least in the sphere of online 
platforms– encourages these ‘voluntary’ privatized enforcement measures by intermediaries. In 
 
92 Domain Name Association, ‘Healthy Domain Initiative’ (August 2017) <https://thedna.org/healthy-domain-
practices/> accessed 24 October 2018. 
93 See e.g. Jeremy Malcolm and Mitch Stolz, ‘Healthy Domains Initiative Isn’t Healthy for the Internet’ (Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, 9 February 2017) <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/02/healthy-domains-initiative-
censorship-through-shadow-regulation> accessed 24 October 2018. 
94 Domain Name Association, above n 93, 5. 
95 Ibid 5. 
96 EURid, ‘EURid and IACC Team Up to Fight Cybercrime’ (Press release, 27 June 2018) 
<https://eurid.eu/en/news/eurid-and-iacc-team-up-to-fight-cybercrime/> accessed 24 October 2018. 
97 Paul Vixie, ‘Notice, Takedown, Borders, and Scale’ (CircleID, 1 March 2017) 
<www.circleid.com/posts/20170301_notice_takedown_borders_and_scale/> accessed 24 October 2018. 
98 Annemarie Bridy, ‘A response to Paul Vixie’s “Notice, takedown, borders, and Scale”’ (Stanford University, The 
Center for Internet and Society, 3 March 2017) <http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/03/response-paul-vixie’s-
notice-takedown-borders-and-scale> accessed 24 October 2018.  
99 See Karen Kopel, ‘Operation Seizing Our Sites: How the Federal Government is Taking Domain Names Without 
Prior Notice’ (2013) 23 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 859. 
100 Internet & Jurisdiction, above n 65, 7. 
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March 2018, the European Commission has put forward the introduction of trusted notifier 
systems broadly for online platforms. Furthermore, this tendency towards privatized expedited 
enforcement mechanisms is not only apparent in relation to the application layer (i.e. online 
platforms) but also the infrastructure layer (i.e. domain name registries). 
Trusted notifier systems, when drawbacks are mitigated, can contribute to more 
efficient enforcement. Theoretically, notifiers are much better equipped to identify unlawful 
content than intermediaries. Additionally, intermediaries can –at least to some degree– refrain 
from twiddling with content-related issues. But the situation also depends on the intermediary 
one is looking at.101 Online platforms, on the one hand, have notice-and-takedown procedures 
in place, often accompanied by content moderation practices that result in takedown of content 
without a third-party notice. Compared to current national regimes based on the E-Commerce 
Directive, trusted notifier regimes are just an adjustment of the notice-and-takedown system 
with an expedited process, by introducing a presumption for privileged third parties. Domain 
registries, on the other hand, as general-purpose technical infrastructure providers have so far 
engaged little in content-debates and -actions. Also in the context of responsibility, however, 
and especially compared to the direct enforcement by intermediaries themselves, these private 
mechanisms based on expert-governance models can come with efficiency gains.  
This brings me to a more general point: I mentioned before the existing notice-and-
takedown models based on the liability regime of the E-Commerce Directive as one starting 
point for trusted notifier-models. Here, as seen, trusted notifiers simply make existing notice-
and-takedown models more efficient. Yet a different conceptual starting point is broader and 
unrelated to the legal framework of the E-Commerce Directive: the political or corporate desire 
to tackle unlawful content online related to ‘responsibility’ rather than ‘liability’. In this 
narrative, trusted notifier-systems can be seen as attempt to solve the role of intermediaries 
regarding unlawful content towards the background of the political expectation to take more 
responsibility.102 I am not arguing whether or to what extent trusted notifier-models are 
beneficial or desirable at the application or infrastructure layer. This is likely to depend on the 
political landscape rather than the contribution by legal scholars, economists or related 
disciplines. The political climate towards enhanced responsibility (vis-à-vis liability) and the 
European lawmaker’s encouragement to rely on non-judicial takedown mechanisms of online 
platforms, might have spill-over effects on the debate of the role of other intermediaries, 
including domain registries, though. Industry and interest organizations are likely to have an 
interest in domain registries’ potential role to block access to content and some registries are 
less reluctant to introduce trusted notifier regimes, too.103 Some agreements between domain 
registries and registrants appear to contain a basis to enforce content- or use-related 
infringements.  
Liability and responsibility are two separate aspects though104 and in the absence of 
secondary legislation, actors need to carefully balance the benefits and drawbacks of privatized 
 
101 See also Husovec, above n 10, 24, differentiating between proximate and remote services. 
102 In this context, see also interrelation to corporate social responsibility e.g. in Emily B. Laidlaw, Regulating 
Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 
2015), 58–115. 
103 See above. Some ccTLDs have a clear stance that only judicial orders would result in the take down of domain 
names. See e.g. Torrentfreak, ‘Pirate Bay Finds Safe Haven in Iceland, Switches to .IS Domain’ (25 April 2013) 
<https://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-finds-safe-haven-in-iceland-switches-to-is-domain-130425/> accessed 24 
October 2018. 
104 See also Frosio, above n 8, 4. 
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enforcement mechanisms before sacrificing at the altar of efficiency. When looking at 
intermediaries and their role regarding unlawful content, one must have a differentiated view 
that acknowledges the different and technical functional roles of intermediaries. One size does 
not always fit all.  
Many concerns raised in relation to notice-and-takedown regimes are also present with 
regard to trusted notifier regimes. The emergence of and reliance on these mechanisms, where 
norm-setting, monitoring and enforcement are centralized in a few private Internet actors, 
presents multiple challenges: these forms of quasi-content-regulation and private norm-setting 
raise legitimacy concerns given their detachment from traditional democratically legitimized 
regulation. 
As shown above, there exists a discrepancy as to the applicable framework for these 
models, depending on the degree of ‘privatization’ of the arrangement. This is illustrated by 
Figure 1 below. Many of the functions performed by these private flagging and takedown 
mechanisms have traditionally been located in the sphere of public actors. Whereas public 
actors are subject to a variety of legal safeguards, private actors are less controlled and enjoy 
contractual freedom. In instances where trusted notifiers are public entities, such as certain 
authorities or governmental bodies, public law rules and principles infuse trusted notifier-
models. This effect is less clear, when models are formed by private actors: both in instances 
where models are encouraged, endorsed or facilitated by state actors and even more so in 
instances where private intermediaries establish trusted notifier-models with private entities 
without state involvement. 
 
Figure 1: Trusted notifier models and their regulatory framework 
 
Trusted notifier-model Legal framework 
Private-Private Contractual freedom? 
Private-Private (Public endorsement) Hybrid? 
Private-Public Fundamental rights, constitutional 
safeguards, administrative law? 
 
Today, these arrangements are largely unaddressed by secondary law. The current EU 
framework simply consists of a non-binding Recommendation which is blurry in its scope and 
content, in addition to leaving many aspects unaddressed.105 Whereas well-intended, 
Recommendation (EU) 2018/334 is unlikely sufficient to create a level field or standard for 
these trusted notifier-models. The main issues addressed in this paper relate to the selection of 
trusted notifiers, the mitigation of the risk of over-removal and the principal–agent problem 
but there exist likely other aspects that need to be addressed. In the case of domain names, 
my concerns towards trusted notifier models are aggravated: the administration of domain 
names constitutes a monopoly and whereas this is often performed by private companies, they 
constitute a critical resource for society and certain public policy objectives are deeply 
enshrined, especially in the ccTLD sphere. More fundamentally and related to the technical 
layer, a domain name merely renders the access to content easier but is unrelated to the hosting 
of the content.106 The proportionality aspects of domain name-related measure are especially 
important, as only the access to the domain name as a whole can be disabled, making it a 
potentially far-reaching measure. It is clear that the current regulatory initiatives do not have 
 
105 The E-Commerce Directive too, left it to the Member States to specify the notice-and-takedown regime. 
106 See Schwemer, above n 12, 6–7. 
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the domain name system in their crosshair. It is uncertain, however, to what extent domain 
registries could fall under the Recommendation’s scope, leaving these intermediaries with even 
less guidance on trusted notifier-models.107 
Towards this background, the lack of a clear framework is problematic: when industry 
or legislator encourage such models, a clear framework is desirable both to ensure coherence 
and to transfer some of the traditionally ‘public’ safeguards to the private sector –especially as 
the emergence of these models is state-induced or state-supported in many instances. Given 
the anecdotal evidence from trusted notifier-models in this paper, the Council of Europe’s works 
and the Commission’s Recommendation seem to have had little influence on models so far. 
When private parties enforce content, many of the traditional administrative law principles do 
not apply. Husovec argues in the case of rights holders that statutory schemes are quickly 
outdated and slow to deploy, which is why both intermediaries and rights holders should prefer 
voluntary schemes.108 Yet, given the identified issues, intervention that addresses certain 
minimum requirements but also remains flexible to allow for future developments appears 
necessary. The question is then, under what kind of framework these notifier regimes should 
operate. To simply broadly apply administrative law to these models seems unrealistic in most 
instances. At the same time, it is in the public interest that at least some safeguards are applied 
in order to mitigate the principal–agent trade-off: these relate to certain procedural minimum 
requirements and thresholds as well as levels of care on the notifier side. At the minimum level 
stands transparency. It is impossible to assess the functioning and desirability of trusted 
notifier-models without insight in their workings. This relates to a central issue that became 
visible during the research for this paper: the general unavailability of information on these 
privatized takedown models.109 This could partly be mitigated by legislative intervention. Not 
only for academic research, but also for the legitimacy of these models as well as the 
development of best practices it is paramount that enforcement collaborations and their 
mechanisms are available to public scrutiny. To mitigate undesirable effects of trusted notifier-
models, it is also in place to establish an obligation to provide an explanation for the takedown 
and to put in place redress mechanisms. Finally, given the principal–agent relation, there need 
to be taken precautions that prevent the abuse of notices and safeguard that notifiers provide 
high quality notices, e.g. by restricting automated notices to instances where false positives 
compared to human-generated notices are extremely rare. 
Many of these aspects are, in fact, touched upon by the Commission’s Recommendation. 
And whereas a soft law tool can be favorable because of its inherit flexibility, at least the most 
essential criteria should be binding for private intermediaries. This could, for example, be 
addressed when the E-Commerce Directive is undergoing a fitness check. Until then, 
intermediaries –both at the content and at the infrastructure layer– are well-advised to 
implement the Recommendation’s principles. 
 
 
107 Although not explicitly mentioned in the CoE Recommendation of 2018, it is evident from the CoE’s general 
information website on Internet intermediaries that also “entities that distribute domain names” are considered 
intermediaries. See <www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/internet-intermediaries> accessed 23 October 2018. 
108 Husovec, above n 10, 33. 
109 A notable exception in the sphere of copyright takedown notices is the Lumen project, whose data has been 
analysed e.g. in Daniel Kiat Noon Seng, ‘The State of the Discordant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA 
Takedown Notices’ (2014) Virginia Journal of Law and Technology, 369, 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2411915>   
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